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Higher Education under the Islamic Republic: The Case of the Baha’is1
Mina Yazdani
Eastern Kentucky University

Abstract
This article explores the Islamic Republic of Iran’s campaign to deny Baha’is, members of Iran's
largest religious minority, access to higher education. It outlines the contours of this campaign: In the
early 1980s, the newly established Islamic government began dismissing Baha’i students from
universities; later and up to the early 2000s, it forbade them from even participating in the nation-wide
university entrance exam; finally, in order to divert growing international attention from its campaign,
it began admitting a small number of Baha’i students into universities, though in more recent years, it
has expelled the majority of these students before they have completed their studies. Furthermore, this
article surveys the government’s attempts to shut down the educational network Baha’is have formed
in order to provide higher education to their youth, all the while claiming to the international
community that Baha’is exercise the right of higher education. Situating the government’s campaign
to deny higher education within the context of a systematic, government-led campaign of persecution
that has spanned decades, this paper petitions Agamben’s category of Homo Sacer and classifies
Baha’is as a group that has been forcibly reduced by the sovereign to the state of bare life (zoé) outside
the country’s legitimate social life (bios or political life). It further suggests that the Iranian
government’s treatment of Baha’is should be understood within the context of an inherent identity
dilemma facing the Islamic Republic: Is the Islamic Republic a modern state that is concerned with the
well-being of all of its citizens, or is it an ideological entity that will deliberately deprive members of
a minority community of one of their most fundamental human rights?

It was a sunny day in Shiraz, late April 1980. I was a fourth-year medical student at
Shiraz (formerly Pahlavi) University, Iran. Our major course that year was physiology, which
I enjoyed immensely. I had entered medical school in the fall of 1976 with the hope of entering
psychiatry. However, the erudition of the internists teaching physiology made me wonder
whether I should study internal medicine instead. On that beautiful spring day in the city known for
its poets, flowers and birds, we had nearly completed the year-long course and were about to
commence the final module on neuroscience, to cover not only physiology but also the anatomy
of the nervous system. The latter had been left out of last year’s anatomy course, which had been
shortened due to strikes during the 1979 Revolution. As the professor started distributing the thick
handouts, I told myself, “whether I end up entering internal medicine or psychiatry, this is an
extremely important part of the course for me—I should do my best in this module.” I never got
a chance to study those thick neuroscience handouts. And I never became a psychiatrist, or an
internist, or a physician.
That week, another “revolution” began: Some of our zealous classmates tried to shut down
the school. They jumped on the desks and shouted slogans against the “American” elements in
the university. They stood in front of the door in a threatening manner preventing other students
from entering the class. In other faculties, like that of literature, those who wanted to attend classes
were violently attacked. Soon we realized that this was the beginning of what was to be called
the “ Cultural Revolution.” Within three days, the university was closed in order to be
“ cleansed” of unwanted elements.
A year and a half later, an announcement was published in the bulletin of the Islamists of the
university about the imminent, yet gradual, re-opening of the university and the categories of
students that would not be permitted to return.2 The second in their list of those to be dismissed
was “the misguided sects which, according to the consensus of Muslims, have abandoned Islam”
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(Bultan-i jihad-i daneshgahi-yi, 1981). I knew enough about the lexicon of the Shi‘i clerics to
understand that by “misguided sects”, they meant the Baha’is. Beginning in November 1981, they
re-opened our class, but students had to re- enroll. There were initially four Baha’i students in
our class. One previously left Iran at the beginning of the revolution and another became a
Muslim like her deceased mother. The other student, Nayyir al-Din Anvari, whose father had
been executed months earlier for being a Baha’i, and I were denied re-enrollment. We were
dismissed because we were Baha’is. Other universities re-opened gradually; but most took three
years before fully resuming their activities. Close to a thousand3 Baha’i university students and
professors throughout the country were expelled.4
A few years later, a creative process was initiated by the dismissed Baha’i university professors
to teach not only the expelled university students, but also the increasing number of the Baha’i
high school graduates. Their initiative, an unprecedented intra-community network of learning,
came to be known as the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). Meanwhile, younger
generations of Baha’is were barred from entering Iranian universities, year after year. This paper
discusses the deprivation of the Baha’is of Iran from higher education,5 placing it in the larger
context of the Islamic Republic’s identity dilemma:6 a modern state versus an ideological entity.
The former requires equal protection and equality for all of its citizens; the latter, the strict
implementation of a narrow reading of Shari‘a law in which Baha’is, as so-called heretics, have no
social rights. The conflict between these two identities leads to a duplicitous stance: externally
portraying the face of a modern state claiming Baha’is are not discriminated against while in reality
depriving them of their civil rights by all means practicable–thereby excluding generations of
Baha’is from higher education, halting their progress, and preventing them from intermingling
with other Iranians in academia. Notwithstanding such efforts by the civil authorities, the Baha’is
have been able to successfully execute their agency in manners compatible with the principles
they uphold.
Before proceeding, a short introduction to the Baha’i religion and an overview of the
persecution of the Baha’is in Iran under the Islamic Republic are in order.
Who Are the Baha’is?
Baha’is are the followers of Mirza Husayn ‘Ali, known as Baha’u’llah (1817-1892), whom
they believe,7 together with his forerunner Siyyid Ali Muhammad, known as the Bab (18191850), inaugurated a new dispensation in world religions.8 Baha’is believe the world needs a
spiritual rejuvenation every one thousand or so years through the appearance of a Manifestation
of God, whose coming heralds a fundamental change in the world. The teachings of each
Manifestation of God are in accordance with the ever-changing level of understanding of the
people of his time. Ontologically, the Manifestations of God are all one and the same; Abraham,
Moses, Krishna, Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammad the Bab, and Baha’u’llah are all
recognized as Manifestations of the same higher spiritual reality, and this spiritual reality
intermediates between God and humankind. Oneness of God, Oneness of the Manifestations of
God (hence, oneness of the core of their religions), and oneness of humankind form three of the
fundamental principles of the Baha’i religion. The oneness of humankind is the pivot round which
all other teachings of the Baha’i religion revolve. The realization of this essential oneness and
creating consciousness about it are the goals of the Baha’i religion. Its social teachings include the
equality of men and women, the eradication of all prejudices, and the elimination of extreme
poverty and wealth. There are no clerics in the Baha'i religion, and the affairs of the community
are run by the elected bodies at local, national and international levels. The world population of
Baha’is is estimated to be around five million, 9 approximately 300,000 of whom live in Iran.
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An Overview of the History of the Persecution of Baha’is in Iran
With the spread of the Baha’i religion in Iran since its tumultuous birth in that country in the
middle part of the nineteenth century, the persecution of its followers has been a part of Iranian
history. As historian Amanat (2008) indicates, during the Qajar period (1785-1925), anti-Babi
pogroms and campaigns usually occurred during provincial or national crises such as those
caused by harvest failures, famines, and epidemics. The Babis (and later Baha’is) served as
scapegoats to cover the state’s failure in relation to European economic and political intrusion.
Drawing the attention of the public to the evils of this so-called devious sect served to consolidate
relations between the Qajar government and the clergy.
With the demise of the Qajars, and the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925-1941) to power,
physical assaults, including murder, against Baha’is considerably decreased but did not cease. The
last mob attack on Baha’is during this period occurred in 1926, when angry groups killed
somewhere between eight to twelve Baha’is in Jahrum, a small city in the Fars province. The
attacks were apparently instigated by a representative of parliament who sought to gain favor with
anti-Baha’i religious leaders in order to secure re-election. The Baha’is complained to the local
and national authorities to no avail (Yazdani, 2011). Although Baha’is enjoyed reprieve from
physical attacks during the rest of Reza Shah’s “iron-fist” rule,10 they were deprived of certain
social rights in the closing years of his reign when the government forbade Baha’i meetings,
closed Baha’i centers and Baha’i schools, and harassed Baha’is on matters concerning census
forms, marriage certificates, and birth certificates. The government also dismissed some Baha’i
government employees and stripped several Baha'is serving in the army of their ranks (Yazdani,
2011). The motivation behind such harsh measures might lie in Reza Shah’s determination “to
subordinate all other loyalties to allegiance to his person” (Martin, 1984, p.20), or perhaps in his
intention to avoid unnecessary friction with the Shi‘i clerics, that is, friction beyond what was
inevitable for the implementation of what were called his “modernizing” ideas.
With Reza Shah’s forced abdication and Mohammad Reza Shah’s accession to the throne in
1941, the influence of the Shi‘i clerics resurged, and a new era commenced. The situation of
Baha’is during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign (1941-1979) went through different phases, despite
the official narrative of the current Islamic regime, which depicts this period as one of bliss and
prosperity because of Baha’i “collaboration” with the Shah’s regime. To make a long story short,
while the Shah himself did not have an anti-Baha’i stance, his treatment of Baha’is was the net
result of his intricate relations with the Shi‘i clerics on the one hand, and his concern with creating
a favorable international image regarding human rights on the other. From1941 through 1955,
during the periods of socio-political crises, Baha’is were initially scapegoated in the interactions
among the government, the clerics, and the people, and went through several bloody incidents, the
culmination of which was the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign (Yazdani, 2016). During this campaign,
the government of the Shah initially gave the Shi‘i clerics free reign to persecute the Baha’is, but
later, fearing further deterioration of its reputation and human rights record, attempted to inhibit
further attacks by clerics on Baha’is, and refused to accept their official request to purge Iran of all
Baha’is (Tavakoli-Targhi, 2008).11 From the late 1950s to the last years of the Shah’s reign, Baha’is
enjoyed relative security, even if they were officially non-existent in the country (Fischer, 1980;
Yazdani, 2016).
In the latter half of the turbulent year of 1978, the Shah’s regime destabilized, and religiously
motivated physical threats and mob attacks on Baha’is—which had ceased for about two
decades—resurfaced in different parts of Iran, particularly in some rural areas where Baha’is were
expelled from their villages (Fischer, 1980; The Baha’i World, 1986, pp. 271-74) . In 1978, seven
Baha’is were killed in different parts of Iran, mostly as a result of mob violence (Baha’i
International Community [BIC], 2008a, Appendix A).12 Such events, which continued for months
after the February 1979 victory of the Islamic Revolution, were alarming signals to Baha’is of
difficult times ahead.
Published by Western CEDAR, 2015
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The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, let it be known from the
beginning that Baha’is were not to be tolerated in his regime (Yazdani, 2012). In the first three
years of the Islamic Republic, one hundred Baha’is were executed (BIC, 2008a, Appendix I).
Many more were arrested and jailed with long sentences, and community properties were
confiscated. All Baha’i government employees were dismissed from their jobs, and Baha’i
students were expelled from universities. In some cases, for a limited period of time, school-aged
Baha’is were dismissed from elementary, middle and high schools.13 In 1983, the government
officially outlawed all the institutions of the Baha’i Administrative Order, basically composed of
Assemblies of nine members elected by the vote of the believers at the local and national levels.14
In obedience to the law of the government, as the Baha’i teachings dictate, the Baha’i community
closed all the local Spiritual Assemblies functioning at the level of the cities, and the National
Spiritual Assembly. Over time, the harsh initial attacks of the 1980s gave way, in the 1990s,
to steady pressure of a cultural and economic nature intended to strangle the Baha’i community
and force Baha’is to convert to Islam.15 These changes were memorialized by a secret 1991
memorandum signed by the Supreme Leader, which will be discussed below.
Arrests, imprisonments, and hate- mongering against Baha’is has only increased since the
presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013).16 In 2008, the seven members of the ad hoc
committee overseeing the affairs of the Baha’is of Iran were imprisoned. Each received a twentyyear sentence, which was recently reduced to ten years, according, reportedly, to the lawyers of
the defendants. Many others have been incarcerated for varying durations, the allegations usually
being national security-related charges. This pattern has not changed during the presidency of
Hasan Rouhani (2013- ).
Why the Persecutions?
The short answer to this question is that most Shi‘i clerics in Iran consider the Baha’i religion
heretical and feel threatened by it. Mainstream Islamic reading of a verse from the Qur’an (33:40)17
makes Muslims believe i n the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood. Therefore, the majority
of Muslim clerics consider a religion appearing after Islam a mere heresy which must be uprooted.
Most of them also feel threatened by it because it attracted a large following early in the
nineteenth century, and its social teachings and fundamental tenets, such as the oneness of
humankind and the equality of men and women, make it attractive to many today. Its lack of an
ecclesiastical order and rejection of clerics as an unnecessary category is particularly unsettling to
the Shi‘i clerics.
Even though the history of anti-Baha’ism in Iran in all its aspects is yet to be studied
academically, in recent decades, historians of Iran have made some valuable contributions.
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi (2008) from the University of Toronto has shed light on the link
between Islamism and anti-Baha’ism, and Yale historian Abbas Amanat (2008) has investigated
the roots of anti-Baha’ism in Iran. Dismissing theories of class conflict as inadequate for
explaining the pattern of anti-Baha’i violence, Amanat interprets their persecutions as a “sociocultural phenomenon.” The Baha’is, he argues, “were a sore point of non-conformity within a
society seeking monolithic unanimity in the face of overwhelming threats from within and outside
of its boundaries; a society fearful of losing its perceived ‘uniqueness’ as the Shi‘i ‘saved sect.’”
The anti-Baha’i sentiments were, in Amanat’s analysis, “a doctrinally admissible ritual to forge a
sense of collective ‘self’ versus an indigenous ‘other’ at a time when the alien ‘other’ was too
intimidating and inaccessible to be viewed as an adversary.” The rejection of “the indigenous
modernity of the Babi-Baha’i world view and its advocacy of universalist inclusion” was the
corollary to “Shi‘i particularism,” a term Amanat uses to refer to the sense of “exclusive self”
that Iranian Shi‘ism aims to construct “out of the fragile complex of the existing religious and
social identities” (pp. 180-181).
Harvard historian Roy Mottahedeh (2008) has also developed a general theory explaining the
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol10/iss1/7
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treatment of Baha’is under different regimes before the Islamic Republic. Situating the conditions
of Baha’is in the interplay between the clerics and the state in modern Iranian history, Mottahedeh
suggests that in Iran,
the Baha’is throughout most of their history were a pawn that…governments played
in their complex game with the mullahs...[N]one of the governments was willing
to surrender this pawn in a single move …Tolerating Baha’is was a way of showing
mullas who was boss. Correspondingly, allowing active persecution of the Baha’is
was the low-cost pawn that could be sacrificed to the mullas when the government
was in trouble or in special need of mulla support. (pp. 238-239)
Houchang Chehabi (2008), professor of International Relations and History at Boston
University, in investigating the roots of secular anti-Baha’ism in Iran, proposes that Baha’i
cosmopolitanism deeply rooted in the tenets of their religion causes anti-Baha’i prejudices in many
secular Iranians, mostly nationalists with xenophobic tendencies. Reza Afshari (2008), Professor
of History and Human Rights at Pace University, focuses on anti-Baha’ism under the
Islamic Republic. Proposing that political considerations and state expediencies alone do not fully
explain the anti-Baha’i policies and actions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as Baha’is did not
present a challenge to the consolidation of the Islamic regime, Afshari suggests that such actions
originated “in the clerics’ aversions, whose roots lay in a pre-modern religious prejudice” and
“their dislike of a home-grown religious faith.” He also demonstrates that in post-revolutionary
Iran, whenever the political factions have vied with one another for power, the persecution of
Baha’is has increased (p. 238).
In diagnosing the political conditions of our time, the Italian political philosopher, Giorgio
Agamben (b. 1942) petitions the notion of Homo Sacer and draws upon two distinct notions of life
available to the ancient Greeks: zoé, something that is alive and not dead, and bios, life as taking
a particular Form, e.g., the life of “a European carpenter or of a Persian king” (Ugilt, 2014, p.39).
Homo Sacer is a juridical term found by Agamben in archaic Roman law referring to someone
who “may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (Agamben 1998, p. 8). The idea of Homo Sacer, or
bare life, Agamben says, is still with us. It refers to a life that is completely bare, a life lived as
pure zoé. Human beings today still can be reduced to homines sacri (Ugilt, 2014, p.39-40). In this
sense, Homo Sacer is a person excluded from society, having no rights or functions in society.
Using Agamben’s conceptualization, it can be said that for the Islamic Republic, Baha’is as
the followers of a post-Islamic religion (hence, considered inherently “ heretical,”) fall into the
category of Homo Sacer, forcibly reduced to the state of bare life (zoé), outside the country’s
legitimate social life (bios or political life). According to Agamben, the device the state uses to
reduce people to bare-life is the “state of exception.” The 1979 Revolution created the perfect “ state
of exception” for the new regime to reduce Baha’is to bare life and exclude them from the nation’s
bios. Consequently, Baha’is were killed, exploited, and denied their rights in the years that
immediately followed the Islamic revolution. Similarly, the “Cultural Revolution” that followed
the political revolution was another “ state of exception” during which Baha’is were denied
access to higher education, a situation that, in effect, continues to this day.
While it is true, as we saw in Amanat’s analysis for the Qajar era, and Yazdani’s for the Pahlavi
era, that ever since the inception of the new religion in Iran in the nineteenth century, almost all
the crises in the country, be it natural disasters (such as periods of famine during the Qajar period),
or socio-political crises (such as the economic difficulties and other post-1953 coup d'état problems
in 1955), were perceived as “states of exception” in which looting, raiding and killing the bare
life, the excluded, the outsider, and the Other could be committed with indemnity, it was the
establishment of the Islamic Republic that intensified and consolidated this pattern. The Shi‘i
theocracy that was established in Iran after the 1979 Revolution officially, blatantly, and more
strictly than before limited the arena of legitimate social life, bios, to the followers of the four
religions of Islam, Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, and radically excluded Baha’is from
this arena, reducing them to the state of bare life, Homo Sacer, who could even be killed with no
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punishment for the murderer.
With this background on the history of anti-Baha’i activities in Iran, the remainder of this paper
will focus on the particular case under study, the Islamic government’s prohibition of Baha’is from
entering universities in Iran, and its attempts at preventing BIHE from functioning.
“Their Progress and Development” Must be “Blocked”
For more than twenty years following the dismissal of all Baha’i students from
universities, Baha’is high school graduates were not permitted to take part in the nationwide university entrance exam. The application form had a question on religion, where applicants
had to choose one of the four officially recognized religions of the country: Islam, Christianity,
Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. Since Baha’is did not identify themselves with any of the four,
they would not choose any of the options, the majority rather adding a note in the “explanations”
section that they were Baha’is. As a result, they would not be sent the card needed to enter the
examination hall. The international repercussions of the Iranian government’s prohibiting
Baha’i students from entering universities—with governments, educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations and individuals raising questions about this situation—finally led the
authorities to devise strategies that would generally keep Baha’i students out of universities,
while pretending to the world that Baha’is were not being discriminated against. To understand
what follows, it must be explained here that the university admission process has three major
stages: 1) applying for the nation-wide entrance exam; 2) applying for specific universities based
on the result of the exam, the transcript of which they have received; and 3) enrolling in the
particular program providing admittance. Over the years, various ploys have been put into place
to exclude Baha’is at each of these stages, and even after the actual enrollment during their studies.
In 2005, Husayn Mehrpour, the advisor to Mohammad Khatami, the reform-minded president
of Iran from 1997 to 2005, and the head of the committee responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the Constitution, published a collection of communications from the office of
the president pertaining to the “ difficult duty” of the committee he headed. Some of these
communications are about Baha’is and their complaints to both Iranian authorities and
international societies. A couple of the communications were related to BIHE, one of them to the
complaints of Baha’is regarding the major 1998 raid on this institution (see below). Mehrpour
attracts the President’s attention to the issue, and the latter refers the case to the Supreme Council
of the National Security and orders rapid investigation (pp. 601-602,636). It can be inferred, from
the communications, that at least some of the authorities of Khatami’s administration had
concerns about the plight of the Baha’i students, but to little avail. Nonetheless, it was perhaps as
a result of such communications that a change happened in 2004-2005, the last year of the
Khatami presidency.
In 2004, the National Education Measurement and Evaluation Organization issued new
application forms with a change that sounded promising: The question of religious identity was
replaced by one asking on which religion the applicant wanted to be examined. The Baha’is gladly
filled out the forms and took the entrance exam for the first time in years. However, when they
received their transcripts, they saw that on the top of the page it was mentioned: “Religion: Islam.”
Astonished and disappointed, they decided that moving on to the next step o f applying for
the programs and universities of their preference, based on their score, would practically
mean admitting the false religious identity indicated on the exam results. In other words, they
had to accept identification as Muslims in order to enter university (BIC, 2004a; BIC 2004b).
Interestingly, near the end of the application deadline, some Baha’is who had received their
transcripts were contacted by the authorities asking why they had not applied. The authorities
quickly resolved the problem by printing new exam results without noting a religious affiliation.
Once the final results were announced, however, only eight out of hundreds were accepted, and all
to the school of languages. The eight decided not to begin their studies to demonstrate solidarity
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol10/iss1/7
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with the near thousand that were denied. Later, Morteza Nourbakhsh, the person within the
National Education Measurement and Evaluation Organization responsible for the “Moral
Selection” of the applicants, confided to some Baha’i youth that this supposed resolution stemmed
from the presence of six UNESCO judges visiting Tehran to investigate international complaints
regarding the educational persecution of the Baha’is. The whole process of contacting a number
of Baha’is asking them why they had not applied was to make the UNESCO judges believe
Baha’is were allowed to enter Iranian universities.18 Faced with the question of why religious
affiliation remained on transcripts, the Iranian government’s representatives stated before the
international community that the reference to religion on the forms was not about the religion of
the applicant, but the religion on which they wished to be examined. In 2006, despite a degree of
skepticism, in a gesture of goodwill, and with the hope of finally finding a solution to a
problem that had besmirched the name of Iran, Baha’is accepted the explanation posed by the
Iranian government, and went on with interpreting the incorporation of “Religion: Islam” on the
university entrance exam results as their choice of religious studies, not religious identity (The
Universal House of Justice, 2007). Around a thousand students applied for universities and while
the majority were denied acceptance on the pretext that their files were “incomplete,” fewer than
two hundred entered universities. Later that year, however, Asghar Zarei, the head of the central
security office of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, in a confidential letter,
instructed the administrators of 81 institutions of higher education all over Iran, to dismiss any
student as soon as she or he is identified as a Baha’i (BIC, 2007). This was proof that the claims
made by the Iranian government’s representative before the international community were
completely false (The Universal House of Justice, 2011). Almost two-thirds—128 out of the
approximately 200— of the Baha’i students who had entered universities in the autumn of 2006
were gradually expelled during the 2006-2007 academic year (BIC, 2007). When the Baha'i
International Community's representative to the United Nations brought up this information, a
spokesman for Iran's mission to the United Nations said the information was “baseless” and
charges were wrong, adding, “No one in Iran has been expelled from studying because of their
religion” (Nicholos, 2007). An even more blatant claim unraveled the instrumental use of
allowing occasional Bahai students to be present in universities in Iran. Following the press
release issued in late March 2006 by Ms. Asma Jahangir, the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, about the government’s
call for the Baha’is in Iran to be secretly monitored (BIC, 2006), Iranian diplomats responded
by claiming Baha’is not being prevented from higher education as a testimony to their not being
persecuted.
In 2007, the Education Evaluation Organization, declared as “ incomplete”—and therefore
invalid—the applications of some 800 Baha’is who took the national exam for university entrance
for the academic year 2007–2008 (The Universal House of Justice, 2007). The situation since then
has continued. A proportionately small number of Baha’i applicants are accepted only to be
expelled later on—whether in the first semester or the last—as soon as their Baha’i identity is
brought up. Students usually discover that they have been dismissed when they attempt to log into
their accounts at the university and find a message stating that their account has been blocked due
to “a security problem” and will be referred to the security office for further “legal” steps. It is
only when students follow up that they are orally told that they have been dismissed because they
are Baha’is. In some cases, students have been told that they will not be given a document
specifying the cause of their dismissal because such a document “would be used in Zionist circles”
against the government.19 In rare cases where a written letter is provided, the cause of dismissal is
intentionally left in vague, non-specific terms such as lacking the “general qualifications”
required,20 or even just “due to some reasons,”21 or due to “legal obstacles.”22 Iranian authorities
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are quite careful not to provide Baha’is with documents that might confirm the actual reason for
their exclusion from higher education, which would thereby contradict the claims of Iranian
representatives. To bypass the hassles of covering up dismissals, the preference of the authorities
is not to admit Baha’is in the first place. The majority of the Baha’i applicants are refused entrance,
simply on account that their files are “incomplete” (BIC, 2008b; BIC 2008c). In 2014, as a new
tactic to conceal the fact that the Iranian government prevents Baha’is from entering universities,
the applicants were told to go the local testing office for their results. There, they were shown but
not physically given papers that say only Muslims and “officially recognized minorities” were
allowed to be accepted into university (BIC, 2014).
Baha’is have done their best to accommodate the requirements of application. For example,
in recent years, the “general conditions” required, among other things, “Belief in Islam, or one
the religions indicated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Judaism, Christianity,
Zoroastrianism),” “lack of enmity toward the authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and a
prohibition on propagating the “fake religions” (Saziman-i sanjish-i amuzish-i kishvar,
2014).Obviously, the religious conditions were set there in order to exclude Baha’is, or to force
them to recant their religion if they want to get accepted. The Baha’i community, however,
interpreted the “belief in Islam” as not necessarily tantamount to being a Muslim. After all, they
thought, as Baha’is they do believe in the truth of Islam and other religions. Therefore, they
found no contradiction between their being Baha’is and meeting this condition. Furthermore,
they thought their religion is not “fake,” and therefore, the other prohibiting item does not apply to
them either. The “Guide to the Enrollment and Participation in the Nation-wide University
Entrance Exam,” for 2016 has now been published by the Ministry of Science, Research and
Technology. It has all the above conditions23 and includes t h e “ important notifications” t h a t
further require that “whenever it is clarified that the applicant has hidden some facts, or lacks
some of the conditions indicated in this notebook, they will be deprived [from education] be
it at any stage in the enrollment process or actual education in the university” (p. 14). This
specific requirement confirms the 2006 instructions issued by the head of the central security
office of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology ordering the dismissal of students
identified as Baha’is. The basis for those instructions is a far more significant—and
likewise confidential—memorandum.
The confidential memorandum, dated 25 February 1991 (corresponding to 6 Isfand 1369, in
Iranian calendar), w a s approved by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and written
by Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani, then secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of the Cultural
Revolution. It was disclosed in 1993 by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (d. 2012), the Salvadoran jurist
who was at the time serving as the U.N. Human Rights Commission's special representative on
Iran (Ahmari, 2012).24 Addressing “the Baha’i question,” the memorandum expatiated upon the
policy of the Islamic Republic to, using the words of the international body governing the affairs
of the Baha’i community, “eradicate the Baha’i community as a viable entity” (The Universal
House of Justice, 2011). The memorandum followed and disclosed the larger plan of the Iranian
government to push Baha’is to convert to Islam, through closing doors of any social progress to
them, so that if they do not convert, they end up being an illiterate, uneducated and poor
community. In the memorandum’s “summary of the results of the discussions and
recommendation,” under the subtitle “A. General status of the Baha’is within the country’s
system,” item number three stated, “The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way
that their progress and development are blocked.” Under the subtitle, “B. Educational and cultural
status,” item number three stated, “They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission
process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Baha’is.” One
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item under the subtitle, “C. Legal and social status,” indicates, “to the extent that it does not
encourage them to be Baha’is, it is permissible to provide them with the means for ordinary living
in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets,
passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc.”25 Even though the memorandum was issued in
1991, as far as the deprivation from higher education is concerned, it basically just articulated a
policy that had practically been in place since re-opening of the universities after the “Cultural
Revolution” in the early 1980s. In other respects, however, the memorandum reflected a shift from
overt persecution, such as killing, to covert, steady, long-term economic and social strangulation, a
policy that had in fact begun in the mid- to late-1980s. In effect, it summed up what the government
had been doing to that point and provided a blueprint for the future treatment of Baha’is. The
duplicitous stance of the Iranian government since 2005 vis-à-vis the question of Baha’is and
higher education is simply the application of the recommendations of the memorandum approved
by Ayatollah Khamenei, and further emphasized, in 2005, by the confidential letter of Zarei, the
head of the central security office of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. The
handful of Baha’i students who have been allowed to continue and finish their studies seems to
have been kept for the Iranian government to be able to claim, in the face of the international
community, that Baha’is are not discriminated against, and are, in fact, studying at the universities.
The Baha’i Institute for Higher Education
The harsh attacks on the Baha’i community, particularly the imprisonments and
executions, gradually decreased to some degree26 after the first few years, even though
discrimination, deprivation of most of the social rights, and economic pressure continued
with the original intensity.27 There were several reasons for this change, including the fact that
the persecution, particularly the executions, attracted the attention of the people of the world and
practically led to results untoward for the Islamic Republic—more recognition of the Baha’i
religion, on the one hand, and negative reputation for the revolutionary government, on the other.
The relative, though temporary, decrease in imprisonments and executions in the late 1980s
provided the Baha’i community with a respite to consider the worrisome prospect of its youth
being excluded from universities in their own country—a deprivation that, in terms of its long-term
consequences, could be regarded as the worst among persecutions, given the Baha’i religion’s
emphasis on education. To make up for this lack, in 1987, a number of the dismissed Baha’i
university lecturers managed to create an informal network of higher education with a curriculum
and selection process similar to prestigious universities, despite the limited resources in their
disposal. The institute thus created—“The Scientific Program,” as it was then called—provided
much hope and motivation for Baha’i youth in high schools. In a country where the main
incentive for doing well in high school comes from the prospect of entering a university, these
youth had a difficult time keeping their motivations high prior to the establishment of this higher
education program, knowing all too well that they would not be given a chance even to take the
university entrance exam, let alone begin their studies. With BIHE, despite their total awareness
that it could not provide them with a degree officially recognized inside Iran, they had hope for
higher education. By the mid-1990s, the informal educational network had turned into a more
extensive program and was called the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). Teaching
was primarily by correspondence, with small classes in private homes (BIC, 2005; Iran Human
Rights Documentation Center, 2006). Those teaching at BIHE were professors dismissed from
Iranian universities and various other physicians, dentists, lawyers and engineers. The majority
of those teaching at this informal network of learning were graduates of Iranian universities,
while others had graduated from Western universities, some quite prestigious (BIC, 2005).28
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Everyone involved worked on a voluntary basis, and no Baha’i was actually paid in connection
with services rendered to BIHE (BIC, 2005). Education continues to be primarily through
correspondence courses, with occasional in-class meetings at the homes of the students or
professors. Practical considerations and security issues have led to more courses being offered
online. Over the course of the past decade, BIHE has also been assisted by a large number of
volunteer professors from around the world who form its Affiliated Global Faculty (AGF). Despite
the simplicity and lack of facilities, BIHE achieved such a high academic standard that some
graduates of BIHE have been accepted at dozens of university graduate programs outside Iran
(BIC, 2005). Following their graduate degrees, the majority of BIHE students selflessly choose
to return to Iran and teach at BIHE (The Universal House of Justice, 2011).

The Government’s Reaction to BIHE
The Iranian government, which was closely observing the activities of the Baha’is, soon
became aware of the formation of a network of learning inside the Baha’i community, and
showed no particular opposition during the first few years.29 Perhaps it assumed that the whole
process would ultimately be nothing more than something to keep both groups, the professors and
the youth, busy, with no actual results. What would an institute for higher education be like, after
all, if the government does not recognize it? This assumption, if actually the case, proved false.
While BIHE was not officially recognized inside Iran, a number its graduates managed to gain
admittance to universities in North America for graduate studies. Carleton University in Canada
was the first university to accept the graduates of BIHE into its Master’s programs. Soon,
other Western Universities followed suit. The recognition of BIHE outside Iran, and by
prestigious universities in particular, was perhaps the reason why Iranian authorities changed their
attitude towards the institute. BIHE had proved, by its recognition abroad, that it could provide
students with a real and quality education, which the Iranian government did not want them
to have (see below). Between 29 September and 3 October 1998, during centrally orchestrated,
well-coordinated attacks, government officials operating under the auspices of the Ministry of
Information, an intelligence agency of the Iranian Government, raided the houses of the main
BIHE lecturers and many of its students in Tehran and outlying provinces. They arrested thirtysix faculty members and staff. They also confiscated all school equipment, including books,
photocopiers, fax machines, and computers, that pertained to the study in BIHE in more than five
hundred homes (BIC, 2005).30 The raid and arrests were, to some degree, unexpected by BIHE
students, professors, and administrators,31 but they were determined to continue. The attack and
arrests brought BIHE and its plight to the attention of academics outside Iran. Some institutions
of higher education expressed their protest against the crack- down on BIHE.32 The incident also
had repercussions in major news outlets outside Iran.33 Those who had been arrested were
asked, while in custody, to sign a document declaring that BIHE had ceased to exist and that
they would no longer cooperate with it. They refused to sign any such declaration (BIC, 2005).
The detainees were released after some time. The faculty, administrators and the students were
all determined to continue the pursuit of knowledge, against all odds. In 2001 and 2002, the
government took other actions against the operations of BIHE (BIC, 2011a). Later, there was
again a centrally orchestrated series of raids carried out on the homes of some of the faculty
members and administrators on 22-24 May 2011. Again, in a coordinated campaign, the agents of
the Ministry of Information raided as many as thirty houses in Tehran, and many other cities,
arrested some fourteen of the faculty members and administrators of BIHE, and confiscated hightech gear and books. Some of those arrested were released within a couple of weeks (Mobasherat
& Sterling, 2011; Ahmari, 2012; BIC, 2014 a). The rest were put on trial, accused of "conspiracy
against national security" and "conspiracy against the Islamic Republic of Iran" (BIC, 2011b), and
sentenced to two to five years of imprisonment. Today, a number of them have been released after
finishing the terms of their sentences, while others remain in jail.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol10/iss1/7
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The Response of the Baha’i Community
For Baha’is, continuing the education of their youth is a matter of faith: Universal education is
one of the fundamental tenets of their religion. The gravity of exclusion from higher education
for Baha’is, therefore, goes beyond its long-term socio-economic consequences. The Baha’i
insistence on higher education must be seen, and the sacrifice of those teaching voluntarily at
the risk of losing their freedom must be understood in this context.
As mentioned earlier, the Baha’i community, as a matter of principle, is adamant about obeying
the law of the land. While they accepted the closure of the institutions of the Baha’i Administrative
order in 1983, following the government pronouncing them as unlawful, when it came to the
government’s attempt to close BIHE under the same pretext, Baha’is considered the efforts to
educate their youth a right that could not be taken away. After the 2011 crackdown on BIHE, and
the government’s attempt to declare it illegal, the official Baha’i stance was that learning could
not be outlawed; or to put it more formally, since BIHE did not issue any official diplomas,
portraying it as illegal was absurd. Connecting the existence of BIHE to the government’s
prohibiting Baha’is from attending universities, the international body heading the world-wide
Baha’i community wrote:
It is as though one were to deny certain citizens access to available food supplies and when
they undertake with untold hardship to cultivate their backyards in order to survive, declare
their efforts illegal and destroy their crop. Persistence in these dehumanizing acts serves
only to expose the irrational determination of the authorities to block the social progress of
the Baha’is. (The Universal House of Justice, 2011)
From the days of harsh persecutions in the early days of the new regime in 1979, as had been the
case before, the Baha’i response to oppression has been first and foremost to appeal to the relevant
Iranian authorities. It was only when such appeals went unanswered that Baha’is all over the world
started appealing to international organizations. In recent years, the Baha’i community has tried to
raise the consciousness of the people of the world, particularly academics, about the plight of the
Baha’i youth in Iran and the challenges they face in fulfilling their most natural need as humans,
the need to know.34
Conclusion
Denying Baha’is access to higher education, while outwardly claiming to do otherwise, is
the course of action the Islamic Republic has pursued in order to resolve its identity dilemma:
the conundrum of being an ideologically-founded government or a modern state required to fulfil
its duty to ensure the well-being and progress of all its citizens—the dilemma of religious
versus national identity. In response to this situation, the Baha’i community, in addition to
resorting to legal means to gain the right for its youth to enter universities, created its own network
of learning, the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education, a collective effort that reflected the
importance of education, and the value of selfless service for the members of this community.
The intention of the government of the Islamic Republic is to exclude Baha’is from higher
education, as evidenced in the confidential 1991 memorandum of the secretary of Iran’s Supreme
Council of the Cultural Revolution, approved by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, stating
unambiguously that their development must be blocked. Dismissing all Baha’i students from
universities during the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980s, and subsequently prohibiting them
from taking the prestigious nation-wide university entrance exam for twenty-five years, are two
strategies the ideologically-driven government has contented itself with pursuing. Believing
Baha’is to be heretics, a government that identifies itself first and foremost with Shi‘ism has had
Published by Western CEDAR, 2015
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no problem depriving Baha’is of their most fundamental human rights. It has sought to deprive
them of any means that could lead to their upward social mobility and influence. Continuing
complaints from Baha’is both inside and outside the country led to international concern. In
response, the Islamic Republic revised its policy without inhibiting its fundamental goal to weaken
the Baha’i community as much as possible. Since 2004, a portion of the Baha’i students have been
allowed to take the entrance exam, a small percentage of those applying for the universities have
been admitted, while the majority have been rejected under the premise that their files are
“ incomplete”. From the small number of students who have been accepted, the majority has been
expelled at some point in their studies. Only a handful have been allowed to graduate.
Given the importance of education for Baha’is, in 1987, the dismissed university professors
resolved to establish an intra-community network of learning, which, even though not recognized
by the government, could provide the youth with both motivation and opportunity for education.
Over time, this institute for higher education, although not recognized inside the country, managed
to educate graduates that could enter universities outside Iran to continue their studies. This success
caused the government to crack down on BIHE, confiscating its instructional tools and arresting
its faculty and staff. Tolerating long prison sentences, those running BIHE did not succumb to the
government’s absurd wish to close this main venue of higher education for its youth.
Perhaps the dilemma the Islamic Republic of Iran faces—doing what its very narrow reading
of “correct” religiosity dictates, while saying that it operates in a way that the world expects a
modern government to operate—is a compelling argument for the institutional separation of
religion and state in the contemporary world. The plight of the Baha’i community of Iran, including
its youth and their quest for a fundamental and basic human right, the right to learn and to acquire
knowledge, in turn, can be regarded as representative of the persecution of the followers of all new
religions in world history.
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